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Administrative Detention of Terrorists:
Why Detain, and Detain Whom?
Matthew C. Waxman

*

INTRODUCTION
A debate rages in the halls of universities as well as in Congress and
national security agencies about whether the United States should enact
new “administrative” or “preventive” detention laws – laws that would
authorize the detention of suspected terrorists outside the normal criminal
1
justice system. Advocates argue that criminal law alone is inadequate to
combat transnational terrorist networks spanning continents and waging
violence at a level of intensity and sophistication previously achievable
only by powerful states, but that the law of war is inadequate to protect
2
liberty. Jack Goldsmith and Neal Katyal, for example, call on “Congress
to establish a comprehensive system of preventive detention that is
3
Critics warn that new
overseen by a national security court.”
administrative detention laws will undermine liberty, and they assert that
criminal law already provides the government with ample tools to arrest,

* Associate Professor, Columbia Law School; Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on
Foreign Relations; Member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and
Law. Thanks to Ken Anderson, Bobby Chesney, David Cole, Justin Florence, Matthew
Gerke, Neal Katyal, Jack Goldsmith, Aziz Huq, Trevor Morrison, Samuel Rascoff, Gabor
Rona, Steve Vladeck, and Benjamin Wittes for comments on earlier drafts. This article
elaborates on a paper commissioned by the Brookings Institution for a workshop on
counterterrorism and statutory law.
1. On July 27, 2008, the Washington Post editorial page called for “a specialized
national security court” that would “assess whether [the] government was justified in
detaining a suspect,” Workable Terrorism Trials, WASH. POST, July 27, 2008, at B6, opposite
an opinion piece by a federal judge arguing that such a proposal “risks a grave error in
creating a parallel system of terrorism courts unmoored from the constitutional values that
have served our country so well for so long.” John C. Coughenour, Op-Ed., The Right Place
to Try Terrorism Cases, WASH. POST, July 27, 2008, at B7.
2. See, e.g., BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR 151-182 (2008); Andrew
McCarthy & Alykhan Velshi, We Need a National Security Court (2006) (unpublished
White Paper submitted to American Enterprise Institute, available at http://wsprod1.
webrecruiter.com/fdd2/images/stories/national%20security%20court.pdf); Amos N. Guiora,
Quirin to Hamdan: Creating a Hybrid Paradigm for the Detention of Terrorists, 19 FLA. J.
INT’L L. 511 (2007); Tung Yin, Ending the War on Terror One Terrorist at a Time: A
Noncriminal Detention Model for Holding and Releasing Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 29
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 149 (2005); Benjamin Wittes & Mark Gitenstein, A Legal
Framework for Detaining Terrorists (Brookings Institution, Opportunity 08 Paper, 2008),
available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/~/media/Files/Projects/Opportunity08/
PB_Terrorism_Wittes.pdf; Jack Goldsmith, Long-Term Detention and Our National
Security Court (Brookings Institution, Feb. 4, 2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/
papers/2009/0209_detention_goldsmith.aspx.
3. Jack Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, Op-Ed., The Terrorists’ Court, N.Y. TIMES, July
11, 2007, at A19.
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charge, and prosecute suspected terrorists. Center for Constitutional Rights
President Michael Ratner writes that preventive detention “cuts the heart
5
out of any concept of human liberty.”
This debate has only intensified since the Supreme Court held last Term
in Boumediene v. Bush that prisoners at Guantánamo have a constitutional
6
right to habeas corpus review of their detention. The Court expressly left
unresolved important substantive questions such as the scope of the
7
Executive’s power to detain, and delegated to lower courts resolution of
the procedural issues likely to arise in hundreds of resulting habeas
8
petitions. Administrative detention proponents argue that these openings
invite Congress to enact legislation to clarify the uncertainties, recognizing
9
that the modern-day terrorist threat necessitates new legal tools. Critics
draw the opposite lesson from Boumediene. A week after the decision
came down, the bipartisan Constitution Project published a report
condemning administrative detention proposals, arguing that Boumediene
“illustrates [that] existing Article III courts are fully capable of adjudicating
issues regarding the legality of detention. There is no need to create a
specialized tribunal either for Guantanamo detainees or for anyone else who
10
may be subject to detention under existing law.”
This article aims to reframe the administrative detention debate, not to
resolve it. In doing so, however, it aspires to advance the discussion by
highlighting the critical substantive choices embedded in calls for legal
4. See, e.g., Kenneth Roth, After Guantánamo: The Case Against Preventive
Detention, 87 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May/June 2008, at 2; Gabor Rona, Legal Frameworks to
Combat Terrorism: An Abundant Inventory of Existing Tools, 5 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 499 (20042005); Richard B. Zabel & James J. Benjamin Jr., In Pursuit of Justice: Prosecuting
Terrorism Cases in Federal Court (Human Rights First, White Paper, 2008), http://www.
humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf; THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, A
CRITIQUE OF “NATIONAL SECURITY COURTS” (2008), available at http://www.constitution
project.org/pdf/Critique_of_the_National_Security_Courts.pdf; see also Deborah Pearlstein,
We’re All Experts Now: A Security Case Against Security Detention, 40 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L. L. 577 (2008) (arguing that even if valid under U.S. and international law, preventive
detention schemes are ineffective in combating terrorism).
5. Michael Ratner, Letter to the Editor, A New Court for Terror Suspects?, N.Y.
TIMES, July 16, 2007, at A12.
6. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
7. While mandating that Guantánamo detainees receive access to U.S. federal courts
empowered to correct errors after “meaningful review of both the cause for detention and the
Executive’s power to detain,” id. at 2269, the Court made clear that it was “not address[ing]
the content of the law that governs petitioners’ detention.” Id. at 2277.
8. See id. at 2276. On July 21, 2008, Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey gave a
speech calling on Congress to legislate clear rules to govern some of the procedural issues
left open by Boumediene. See Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey, Remarks Prepared for
Delivery at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (July 21, 2008),
available at http://justice.gov/ag/speeches/2008/ag-speech-0807213.html.
9. See, e.g., Stuart Taylor, Bush and the Justices Behaved Badly, NAT’L J., June 21,
2008, at 15; Benjamin Wittes, Congress’s Guantanamo Burden, WASH. POST, June 13, 2008,
at A23.
10. A CRITIQUE OF “NATIONAL SECURITY COURTS,” supra note 4, at 4.
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procedural reform and by pointing the way toward appropriately tailored
legislative options. It argues that the current debate’s focus on procedural
and institutional questions of how to detain suspected terrorists has been
allowed to overshadow the questions of why administratively detain, and
whom to detain. Not only are the answers to these questions at least as
important as the procedural rules in safeguarding and balancing liberty and
security, but their resolution should precede analysis of the procedural
issues. The soundness of any specific procedural architecture depends
heavily on its purpose and on the substantive determinations it is expected
to make.
To some, the answers to the why and whom questions may seem
obvious – to prevent terrorism we should detain terrorists. With those
basic ideas apparently settled, the administrative detention debate tends to
jump quickly to the question of how to detain: What procedural protections
should we afford suspects? What rights should they have to challenge
evidence proffered against them – and with what kind of lawyer assistance?
11
What kinds of officials should adjudicate cases?
The answers to why and whom are more complex and consequential
than they may seem at first glance. There are several different ways in
which detention can help prevent terrorism, including incapacitating
terrorists, disrupting specific plots, deterring potential terrorists, and
gathering information through interrogation. The choice of which among
these preventive objectives to emphasize will, in turn, drive the way the
class of individuals subject to detention is defined, with major implications
for both liberty and security. The way we answer the why and whom
questions will then significantly determine the procedural architectural
needs of any new administrative detention regime. This article therefore
cautions against jumping too quickly in administrative detention
discussions to the issue of procedural design, or the how questions.
Part I of this article briefly explores the Bush administration’s approach
to the why and whom questions, in particular its reliance on a theory of
“enemy combatants,” and the logic behind calls to reform it through
administrative detention legislation. Part II examines various strategic
objectives behind administrative detention proposals, and Parts III and IV
then explain how those objectives translate into different definitions of the
class subject to proposed detention laws. Part V returns to the procedural
issues and shows how new administrative detention processes – or perhaps
even special national security courts – would likely look very different
depending on the strategic choices underlying them. Rather than coming
down for or against new administrative detention law, this article identifies
11. Cf. Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108
COLUM. L. REV. 1013 (2008) (detailing how most court decisions in cases challenging Bush
administration counterterrorism detention policies have not directly addressed substantive
rights, but instead have focused on procedural rights).
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the approaches that stand the best chance of successfully protecting security
and liberty, as well as questions that should guide further consideration and
refinement of the policies.
I. ENEMY COMBATANT DETENTION AND CALLS FOR
PROCEDURAL REFORM
The Bush administration’s approach to detention began with the notion
12
that the United States is at war with al Qaeda and those aligned with it.
Supporting that notion, the 2001 congressional authorization of the use of
military force authorizes “all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons [the President] determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
13
September 11, 2001,” and the U.N. Security Council declared the day after
9/11 that the terrorist attacks constituted “a threat to international peace and
14
The Bush administration relied in turn on an expansive
security.”
interpretation of its domestic executive war powers and the international
law of war to assert that those fighting – broadly defined – on behalf of al
Qaeda and its affiliates, or in some cases those supporting that fight, are
enemies in an ongoing armed conflict. As such, any of these constituent
agents, or “enemy combatants,” may lawfully be captured and detained for
the duration of hostilities, just as a state would be entitled in the course of a
war with another state to capture and hold enemy soldiers until the end of
15
the war:
Because the United States [is] in an armed conflict with al Qaida
and the Taliban, it [is] proper for the United States and its allies to
detain individuals who [are] fighting in that conflict. One of the
most basic precepts in the law of armed conflict is that states may
16
detain enemy combatants until the cessation of hostilities.
Of course, to the extent this is a war, it is not the usual kind between
states. As former Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey remarked:

12. See generally JACK L. GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT
INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2007); JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S
ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR (2006).
13. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001);
see also Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005).
14. S.C. Res. 1368, ¶1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
15. See Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Vice President et al.,
Humane Treatment of Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002) (reprinted in KAREN J.
GREENBERG & JOSHUA L. DRATEL, THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 134135 (2005)); Remarks by Attorney General Mukasey, supra note 8.
16. John B. Bellinger, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Address at the London
School of Economics: Legal Issues in the War on Terrorism (Oct. 31, 2006), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/2006/98861.htm.
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We are confronted not with a hostile foreign state whose fighters
wear uniforms and abide by the laws of war themselves, but rather
with a dispersed group of non-state terrorists who wear no uniforms
and abide by neither laws nor the norms of civilization. And
although wars traditionally have come to an end that is easy to
identify, no one can predict when this one will end or even how
17
we’ll know it’s over.
While the Attorney General intended this statement to justify the
government’s continuing reliance on its enemy combatant detention
18
authority, problems with this approach are quickly apparent. Although
even in conventional warfare the notion of “enemy combatants” may elude
either clear definition or easy application, members of terrorist
organizations generally try to obfuscate their identities and blend
19
indistinguishably into civilian populations. The organizations themselves
lack the formalized structures of states, thereby greatly exacerbating the
probability of misidentifying an innocent civilian as an enemy (a problem
discussed in greater detail below). The stakes of such errors are also
magnified by the likelihood that this conflict with al Qaeda or its spinoff
organizations will last for decades, thus raising the specter of indefinite
20
deprivation of innocents’ liberty.
Critiques of the Bush administration’s reliance on this “enemy
combatancy” theory to justify detentions have focused heavily on the
21
inadequacy of the process by which detention decisions are made.
17. See Remarks by Attorney General Mukasey, supra note 8.
18. See id. (“But those differences do not make it any less important, or any less fair,
for us to detain those who take up arms against us.”).
19. The law of war contains definitions of certain classes of combatants that are
entitled to particular protections, such as “prisoner-of-war status upon capture,” see, e.g.,
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention], but it generally
defines the broad category of “combatants” only in the negative. Protocol I of the Geneva
Conventions says that “[c]ivilians shall enjoy the protection [from attack] unless and for
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 51(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. Article 3 of the Third
Geneva Convention protects “[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities.” Third
Geneva Convention, supra. These provisions imply that combatancy derives from “direct”
or “active” participation on behalf of an enemy in an armed conflict, which is itself a subject
of great controversy. See International Committee of the Red Cross, Direct Participation in
Hostilities (Dec. 31, 2005), http://icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/participationhostilities-ihl-311205.
20. See Matthew C. Waxman, Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and
Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (2008).
21. See, e.g., DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS
LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR 50-59 (2007); P. Sabin Willett, Op-Ed., Detainees Deserve
Court Trials, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2005, at A21; Statement of U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy
On the Detention Center at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba (June 30, 2005), available at
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Whether arguing that those detained deserve full-fledged criminal trials or
that detentions should be judicially reviewed or that the government failed
even to provide the minimal battlefield hearings required by the Geneva
22
Conventions, critics have tended to focus their attacks on the how
questions of detention. Less often discussed is the whom question – that is,
23
the substantive scope of the detention class.
The U.S. government has so far avoided demarcating the outer bounds
of this class in order to maximize its freedom of action in combating major
24
terrorist networks. In explaining to a U.N. human rights committee its
legal authority to detain suspected al Qaeda fighters, the government stated
that its detention authority extended to “members of al-Qaida, the Taliban,
and their affiliates and supporters, whether captured during acts of
belligerency themselves or directly supporting hostilities in aid of such
25
enemy forces.”
And at Guantánamo, the government has used the
following standard to justify detention, though without further defining
publicly its terms or acknowledging this as the outer boundary of its
asserted detention authority:
[A]n individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaida
forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200506/063005b.html. Cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct.
2229, 2269 (2008) (“Where a person is detained by executive order, rather than, say, after
being tried and convicted in a court, the need for collateral review is most pressing. . . .
What matters is the sum total of procedural protections afforded to the detainee at all stages,
direct and collateral.”).
22. See, e.g., LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, IMBALANCE OF POWERS: HOW
CHANGES TO U.S. LAW & POLICY SINCE 9/11 ERODE HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 4769 (2003), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/loss/imbalance/powers.pdf.
23. For some critiques of the expansive definition, see, e.g., Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli,
534 F.3d 213, 230 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Motz, J., concurring in the judgment) (2008)
(interpreting prior Supreme Court precedent as supporting the conclusion that “enemy
combatant status rests on an individual’s affiliation during wartime with the ‘military arm of
the enemy government.’”); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, International Law, U.S. War
Powers, and the Global War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2653, 2655-2658 (2005)
(arguing that mere membership without conduct is not enough to be categorized as an
“enemy combatant”); Brief for the Boumediene Petitioners, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 U.S.
2229 (2008) (No. 06-1195), 2007 WL 2441590, at 33-34. On March 6, 2009, the Supreme
Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s judgment in Al-Marri and remanded the case with
instructions that it be dismissed as moot. 2009 U.S. LEXIS 1777. The Obama
administration decided to try Al-Marri in federal court rather than to defend the Fourth
Circuit’s approval of military detention. See Robert Barnes & Carrie Johnson, Court Puts
Off Decision on Indefinite Detention; Justices: Indictment Made Issue Moot, WASH. POST,
Mar. 7, 2009, at A5; Adam Liptak, Justices Erase Court Ruling That Allowed a Detention,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2009, at A9.
24. See COLE & LOBEL, supra note 21, at 59-63; see also Boumediene v. Bush, No.
04-1166 (RJL), 2008 WL 4722127 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2008).
25. See Committee Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State
Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Annex 1 at 47, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/48/Add.3 (June 29,
2005).
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the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person
who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported
26
hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.
In one oft-cited litigation colloquy, the government went so far as to argue
that merely providing a charitable gift could qualify the so-called “little old
lady in Switzerland” donor as an “enemy combatant” if the recipient turned
27
out to be an al Qaeda front. Even having backed off this most extreme
28
view, however, the Bush administration steadfastly avoided detailed
public discussion of what it means to be a “member,” how it defined “al
Qaida” or its affiliates and supporters, and what activities constitute
29
belligerency or support or aid to any of these groups or activities.
30
The case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld highlights the Bush administration’s
apparently deliberate ambiguity on this critical definitional question.
Hamdi involved a U.S. citizen captured in Afghanistan and held at
Guantánamo who challenged the legality of his detention. While not stating
clearly the substantive reach of its “enemy combatant” definition, the
government argued that the Executive’s “wartime determination that an
individual is an enemy combatant is a quintessentially military judgment”
31
that no court should second-guess. That is, the government argued until
the Hamdi holding that the Executive should have unreviewable discretion
to decide if an individual falls within the definition of “enemy combatant,”
and that it should have unreviewable discretion to determine the scope of
32
the definition itself.

26. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Order Establishing
Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004), http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul
2004/d20040707review.pdf.
27. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 475 (D.D.C 2005).
28. See Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, supra, 534 F.3d at 226 (Motz, J., concurring in the
judgment).
29. The breadth of the government’s definition came under attack recently by the D.C.
Circuit, see Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834 (D.C. Cir. 2008), and a minority of the Fourth
Circuit, see Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, supra 534 F.3d at 231-247 (Motz, J., concurring in the
judgment). While this article was in press, the Obama administration submitted a
memorandum in habeas corpus proceedings that offered a slightly modified definition of the
class subject to detention at Guantánamo. See Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the
Government’s Detention Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, In re
Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH) (D.D.C. March 13, 2009), at
2, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf.
30. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
31. Brief for the Respondent at 25, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 036696).
32. The Hamdi plurality held that an individual captured on the battlefield in
Afghanistan fell within the implicit detention authority of the 2001 Authorization of the Use
of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, but it explicitly left “[t]he permissible
bounds of the category [of enemy combatant to] be defined by the lower courts as
subsequent cases are presented to them.” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 522 n.1.
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This maneuver was even more starkly visible in the government’s
33
argument in Rasul v. Bush, which involved the question of whether the
federal habeas corpus statute extended federal court jurisdiction to claims
arising at Guantánamo: “The ‘enemy’ status of aliens captured and
detained during war is a quintessential political question on which the
34
courts respect the actions of the political branches.” The government went
on to argue that “courts have . . . no judicially-manageable standards . . . to
evaluate or second-guess the conduct of the President and the military” on
35
such matters.
In both Hamdi and Rasul the government lost on the procedural issue.
In Hamdi the Court held that due process requires a citizen detainee be
36
given adequate notice of and opportunity to contest the claims against him,
and in Rasul it held that statutory habeas rights (i.e., an opportunity to bring
before a federal judge a challenge to detention) apply to detainees at
37
Guantánamo.
Boumediene then went a step further in holding that
38
constitutional habeas rights also apply to Guantánamo detainees. But in
none of these cases did the Court address head on the government’s claim
that it would be impossible to fashion judicially manageable standards of
“enemy combatancy,” and in all of these cases the Court essentially invited
Congress to do so.
Are courts really limited in their capacity to adjudicate the “enemy”
status of detainees? Suppose Congress wants to regulate detention of
enemy terrorists, including establishing a stronger oversight role by the
courts, which is what administrative detention proposals seek to do. Taking
as a point of departure the Bush administration’s assertion that defining
whom to detain is an issue of tremendous policy and strategic significance –
but believing that it is one that Congress and courts ought to have a strong
hand in regulating – how should an administrative detention regime be
constituted in substantive terms?
The vast bulk of discussion of administrative detention immediately
swings back to procedural architecture, based on the assumption that setting
the appropriate level of procedural protection can effectively balance
39
security and liberty. Three particular elements of procedural design are
most consistently and notably thought to be key to this balance: judicial
40
review, adversarial process with lawyer representation, and transparency.
33. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
34. Brief for the Respondents at 35, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334,
03-343).
35. Id. at 37.
36. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004).
37. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480-481.
38. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008).
39. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
40. COLE & LOBEL, supra note 21, at 251-252; AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMMITTEE ON
LAW AND NATIONAL SECURITY ET AL., DUE PROCESS AND TERRORISM: A POST WORKSHOP REPORT
16 (2007), available at http://www.mccormicktribune.org/publications/dueprocess. pdf.
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And, indeed, each of them – individually and in tandem – has a vital role to
play in any effective administrative detention system.
Judicial review can help safeguard liberty and enhance the credibility at
home and abroad of administrative detention by ensuring neutrality of the
decision maker and publicly certifying the legality of the detention in
question. Most administrative detention proposals start with a strong role
for courts. Some believe that a new court is needed, perhaps a National
Security Court made up of specially designated judges who would build
41
expertise in terrorism cases over time.
Others suggest expanding the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’s jurisdiction to handle detention
42
cases, since it already has judges with expertise in handling sensitive
intelligence matters and mechanisms to ensure secrecy. Still others insist
that specialized terrorism courts are dangerous, and that the legitimacy of a
detention system can best be ensured by giving regular, generalist judges a
43
say in each decision.
Adversarial process and access to attorneys can help further protect
liberty and enhance the perceived legitimacy of detention systems. As with
judicial review, though, proposals then tend to split over how best to
organize and ensure this adversarial contest. Some argue that habeas corpus
44
suits are the best check on administrative detention. Others argue that
administrative detention decisions should be contested at an early stage by
45
lawyers of the detainee’s choosing. Still others recognize an imperative
need for secrecy and deep expertise in terrorism and intelligence matters,
which would necessitate a specially designated “defense bar” operated by
46
the government on detainees’ behalf.
This issue of secrecy runs in tension with a third common element of
procedural and institutional reform proposals: openness and transparency.
The Bush administration’s approach had allegedly been prone to error in
part because of excessive secrecy and hostility to the prying eyes of courts
or Congress, let alone the press and advocacy groups. Open or at least
partially open hearings or written judgments that can later be scrutinized by
41. See Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 3; McCarthy & Velshi, supra note 2; Guiora,
supra note 2.
42. See PHILIP B. HEYMANN & JULIETTE N. KAYYEM, PROTECTING LIBERTY IN AN AGE
OF TERROR 18, 51-52 (2005); see also STEPHANIE COOPER BLUM, THE NECESSARY EVIL OF
PREVENTIVE DETENTION IN THE WAR ON TERROR: A PLAN FOR A MORE MODERATE AND
SUSTAINABLE SOLUTION (2008) (recommending using the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court to monitor a statutory regime of preventive detention).
43. See A CRITIQUE OF “NATIONAL SECURITY COURTS,” supra note 4.
44. See, e.g., Alberto J. Mora & Thomas R. Pickering, Op-Ed., Extend Legal Rights to
Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2007, at B7; Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy,
Chairman, Judiciary Committee, On Amendment 2022, The Habeas Corpus Restoration Act
of 2007 (Sept. 19, 2007), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200709/091907.html.
45. See, e.g., Guiora, supra note 2, at 527.
46. See, e.g., Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 3; Wittes & Gitenstein, supra note 2, at
10; McCarthy & Velshi, supra note 2, at 36.
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the public or congressional oversight committees, critics and reformists
argue, would help put pressure on the executive branch to exercise greater
care in deciding which detention cases to pursue and put pressure on
47
adjudicators to act in good faith and with more diligence.
These three elements of procedural design reform – judicial review,
adversarial process, and transparency – may help reduce the likelihood of
mistakes and restore the credibility of detention decision making. That all
three are deeply embedded in American law and international human rights
48
law makes it unsurprising that they would surface consistently in reform
discussions. Rarely, though, do these discussions pause long on the prior
question of what it is that these courts – however more specifically
constituted – will evaluate. Judicial review of what? A meaningful
opportunity to contest what with the assistance of lawyers? Transparent
determinations of what?
Deciding the appropriate factual predicate to be proven or disproven –
that is, to define the class of individuals subject to administrative detention
and the substantive standards by which detentions will be judged – requires
stepping back even further to consider carefully the strategic rationale for
proposed new legal tools.
II. WHY DETAIN?
The reason administrative detention is widely discussed at all is
because the threat of terrorism is thought by proponents to involve a
category of individuals for whom neither criminal justice nor the law of war
– the two legal systems historically used to authorize and regulate most
long-term detention of dangerous individuals – offers effective and just
49
solutions. The argument generally begins with the notion that exclusive
reliance on prosecution, along with its usual panoply of defendants’ rights
and strict rules of evidence, cannot effectively, expeditiously, or
50
exhaustively remove the threat of dangerous terrorists.
The reasons for
47.

See, e.g., Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 3; Wittes & Gitenstein, supra note 2, at

10.
48. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 9, 14, Dec. 19, 1966,
S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
49. See WITTES, supra note 2; Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 3; Matthew Waxman,
Op-Ed., The Smart Way To Shut Gitmo Down, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2007, at B4.
50. France relies on criminal law for detaining suspected terrorists, but its criminal
laws are so expansive and the arrest and investigation powers of the government so potent
that its criminal law system often functions much like administrative detention might. See
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PREEMPTING JUSTICE: COUNTERTERRORISM LAWS AND PROCEDURES
IN FRANCE (2008), http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/07/01/preempting-justice. Pre-trial
detention, for example, can last up to four years. According to France’s legendary
counterterrorism judge, Jean-Louis Bruguiere:
Every government has an obligation to react to the threat. But the common law
system is too rigid, it can’t adapt because its procedural laws are more important
than the criminal laws at the base, and the procedure depends on custom so it
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this include: information used to identify terrorists and their plots includes
extremely sensitive intelligence sources and methods, the disclosure of
which during trial would undermine or even negate counterterrorism
operations; the conditions under which some suspected terrorists are
captured, especially in faraway combat zones or ungoverned regions, make
51
it impossible to prove criminal cases using normal evidentiary rules;
prosecution is designed to punish past conduct, but fighting terrorism
requires stopping suspects before they act; and criminal justice is
deliberately tilted in favor of defendants so that few if any innocents will be
punished, but the higher stakes of terrorism cannot allow the same
52
likelihood that some guilty persons will go free.
On the other hand, the argument continues, the law of war – under
which individual enemy fighters can be captured and held for the duration
of hostilities without trial – does not deal satisfactorily with modern-day
53
terrorism threats either. Law of war rules grew out of conflicts primarily
between professional armies (acting as agents responsible to states) that
could be expected to last months or maybe years but would likely end
definitively. Terrorism, by contrast, involves an enemy whose fighters
cannot be identified with similar precision and is unlikely to end soon or at
all or with any certainty. Applying the traditional law of war detention
rules therefore opens the possibility of indefinite detention without trial
54
combined with substantial likelihood of error.
To its proponents, administrative detention offers a way out of the stark

doesn’t change easily. The civil law system is more flexible because it functions
according to laws voted by parliament and can react faster.
Id. at http://www.hrw.org/en/node/62151/section/4 (quoting Jean-Louis Bruguiere). See also
ANTOINE GARAPON, REAL INSTITUTO ELCANO, IS THERE A FRENCH ADVANTAGE IN THE FIGHT
AGAINST TERRORISM? (2005), http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/807/Garapon807.
pdf.
51. As the Wall Street Journal editorial page put it, “[T]he truth is that in the fog of
battle it is impossible to gather evidence the way a Manhattan cop can. There’s no ‘CSI:
Kandahar.’” Editorial, The Enemy Detainee Mess, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2008, at A10.
52. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME
OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 64-65 (2006) (on risk calculus); Andrew McBride, Op-Ed., We’ll
Rue Having Judges on the Battlefield, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2008, at A7 (on battlefield
constraints); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Establishing a Constitutional Process: Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Daniel Dell’Orto, Principal
Deputy General Counsel, Department of Defense), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1986&wit_id=5506; Michael B. Mukasey, Op-Ed., Jose Padilla
Makes Bad Law, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2007, at A15 (on disclosure of sensitive intelligence
information during trial); David Cole, Closing Guantanamo, BOSTON REV., Jan./Feb. 2009,
available at http://bostonreview.net/BR34.1/ cole.php (on problems related to secrecy and
burden of proof). For counter-arguments, emphasizing that criminal law is sufficient to deal
with terrorism threats, see Roth, supra note 4; Thomas B. Wilner, Op-Ed., We Don’t Need
Guantanamo Bay, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 2008.
53. See WITTES, supra note 2; Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 3.
54. See Waxman, supra note 20.
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55

choice between these two systems. Most likely any sensible alternative
scheme will include some elements that resemble criminal justice and
others that resemble the law of war, for the simple reason that terrorism
56
shares some features of crime and some of war. But this leads to the
difficult questions of where one system should start and another end and
57
how we should sort out who goes into which. So we need to think through
how to define the set of cases that fall between the two existing systems and
that may demand an alternative. This requires a clear notion of the needs:
what is it about terrorism that might necessitate a step so precipitous as
creating a new kind of detention legal system?
There is surprisingly little discussion in the policy or academic realms
of precisely how detention fits within a broader U.S. and allied strategy to
combat terrorism, or perhaps more specifically al Qaeda. At least within
the public domain there appears to be no comprehensive effort by the U.S.
government to review lessons learned to date about the strategic
58
appropriateness of whom it has detained. The 9/11 Commission Report
contained only one significant recommendation with respect to detention
and that had to do with treatment standards, not with the legal powers to
59
detain. The White House’s publicly released 2006 National Strategy for
Combating Terrorism mentioned several times the need to capture enemy
terrorists but mentioned not a single time the role or utility of the broad
detention authorities asserted since September 11, 2001 – a surprising
omission given the tremendous resources that have been devoted to
detention operations at Guantánamo and elsewhere and the immense
opposition to those operations from the courts, Congress, the public, and
60
U.S. allies, among others.
That said, it is virtually undisputed among those who advocate
administrative detention that its purpose is preventive: a prophylactic
61
measure against terrorist threats. Of course, criminal justice also has a

55. See Monica Hakimi, International Standards for Detaining Terrorism Suspects:
Moving Beyond the Armed Conflict-Criminal Divide, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 369 (2008).
56. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES
IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (2006).
57. See Burt Neuborne, Spheres of Justice: Who Decides?, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1090 (2006).
58. The British Government, by contrast, has discussed with much greater precision
how its various detention authorities fit together, and whom it has targeted with them and
why. CABINET OFFICE, COUNTERING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: THE UNITED KINGDOM’S
STRATEGY, 2006, Cm. 6888, at 17-20, available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/
contest-report.
59. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 379-380 (2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/
911Report.pdf.
60. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM
(2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf.
61. Indeed, the term “preventive detention” is often used interchangeably with
“administrative detention.” See, e.g., Jonathan Rauch, The Candidates’ Four Detention

2009]

WHY DETAIN, AND DETAIN WHOM?

13

preventive component. But criminal law is generally retrospective in focus,
62
in that it addresses past acts.
The resulting punishment, including
incarceration, serves preventive purposes insofar as it keeps a perpetrator
off the street (for some period of time) and deters both him and others from
future crime.
Whereas at base criminal justice addresses past harms committed by
63
individuals, administrative detention proposals tend to be prospective in
focus. They start with the conviction that terrorist acts – especially major
attacks – must be addressed before they occur. The consequences of failure
to prevent terrorist attacks are too high, the argument goes, to rely on
retrospective responses alone. When it comes to crime, we do not typically
use the mere likelihood that someone will act – even high likelihood of
violent crime – to justify detention. As Judge Posner explains:
Requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases causes
many guilty defendants to be acquitted and many other guilty
persons not to be charged in the first place. We accept this as a
price worth paying to protect the innocent. But ordinary crime does
not imperil national security; modern terrorism does, so the
government’s burden of proof should be lighter, though how much
64
lighter is a matter of judgment.
We tolerate high levels of recidivism in parole programs, reasoning that it is
more costly to keep all convicts locked up than to accept a certain level of
crime. But terrorism, according to administrative detention proponents, is
different. The ability of small groups to harness modern technology
(including, especially in the future, weapons of mass destruction) to cause
mass casualties, damage, panic, and threats to effective governance puts
65
terrorism on a different plane.
Camps, NAT’L J., Aug. 4, 2007 (using the terms interchangeably); see also Emanuel Gross,
Human Rights, Terrorism and the Problem of Administrative Detention in Israel: Does a
Democracy Have the Right To Hold Terrorists as Bargaining Chips?, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. LAW 721, 752 (2001) (“Administrative detention, sometimes known as preventive
detention, refers to a situation where a person is held without trial.”)
62. There are, of course, some exceptions, such as inchoate crimes or conspiracy
liability.
63. See COLE & LOBEL, supra note 21, at 47-50.
64. POSNER, supra note 52, at 64-65.
65. See id.; ACKERMAN, supra note 56, at 39-57; Ashton B. Carter, John M. Deutch &
Philip D. Zelikow, Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 80
(1998); see also Cass R. Sunstein, National Security, Liberty, and the D.C. Circuit, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 693, 702 (2005) (noting that in the terrorism context, “judicial errors may
turn out to be disastrous rather than merely harmful”). To be sure, concern about the danger
of major terrorist attack can be taken too far, as in what has been dubbed the “One Percent
Doctrine” for dealing with “a low-probability, high-impact threat.” Former Vice President
Dick Cheney stated: “If there’s a one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al
Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our
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This notion of prevention, however, needs to be further unpacked.
There are at least four major ways in which detention contributes to
terrorism prevention:
$
$
$
$

incapacitation
deterrence
disruption
information-gathering

Each of these sub-elements of prevention has implications for how
administrative detention laws should be crafted and how institutions for
adjudicating cases should be designed.
The most natural inclination of a government facing threats of terrorism
is to incapacitate suspected terrorists: If someone has the will and
capability to commit terrorism, keep him off the streets. The purpose of
such detention is not punitive or retributive (though such desires might lurk
in the background); it is protective and preemptive, to put potential threats
out of action. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld described the Guantánamo
detainees in 2002, for example, as “among the most dangerous, best66
trained, vicious killers on the face of the earth,” justifying the camp as
necessary to stop them from carrying out their violent objectives. This
preventive purpose underlies the law of war’s detention rules, in that those
67
rules aim to block captured soldiers from returning to an ongoing fight.
As former Attorney General Mukasey explained:
The United States has every right to capture and detain enemy
combatants in this conflict, and we need not simply release them to
return to the battlefield. . . . We have every right to prevent them
from returning to kill our troops or those fighting with us, and to
68
target innocent civilians.
Beyond incapacitating existing threats, a government might wield the
threat of detention to deter future terrorist recruits from joining the cause or
participating in terrorist activities. In other words, the possibility of getting
caught and held by the government may dissuade terrorists or future
69
terrorists from joining terrorist groups or perpetrating terrorist acts. The
response.” RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE: DEEP INSIDE AMERICCA’S PURSUIT
OF ITS ENEMIES SINCE 9/11, at 61, 62 (2006).
66. Press Briefing, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld (Jan. 27, 2002), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=232.
67. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
68. Remarks by Attorney General Mukasey, supra note 8.
69. Discussion of deterrence is usually divided into two concepts, both of which are
relevant here: specific deterrence, which discourages an individual from certain conduct by
instilling an understanding of negative consequences, and general deterrence, which makes
an example of an individual’s punishment to discourage the broader population from deviant
conduct. See generally Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of
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more credible the threat of capture and detention, and the more severe the
consequences (say, the longer the threatened period of detention, or the
more severe its conditions), so the theory goes, the greater the deterrent
pressure.
These notions of incapacitating or deterring terrorists or future terrorists
may potentially point at large groups of individuals and their dangerous
activities: If we can discern who has the intent and capability – or potential
to develop that intent and capability – to commit or support terrorist acts,
we will try to block or dissuade them. But a narrower way to formulate a
preventive purpose of administrative detention is to disrupt terrorist plots:
A group of individuals is preparing to carry out a terrorist attack or
campaign of attacks, so use the detention of certain persons to foil that
70
plot. Whereas incapacitation focuses heavily on the characteristics of
categories of individuals, disruption focuses on their joint or individual
activities. It is not so much about neutralizing very dangerous people as
neutralizing their impending schemes.
Each of these preventive strategies contains some key assumptions
about the government’s knowledge of the terrorist threat. An incapacitation
strategy assumes the state’s ability to assess accurately who is likely to pose
a future danger and to therefore devote resources to stemming their future
dangerous activities. A prevention strategy emphasizing deterrence
assumes the state’s ability to manipulate sufficiently the fears of future
terrorists at large. And a disruption strategy assumes the state’s ability to
71
identify plots in advance and their key individual enablers.
A fourth preventive reason to detain is therefore to gather information.
Thwarting terrorist plots requires getting inside the heads of network
members, to understand their intentions, capabilities, and modes of
operation. Detention can facilitate such intelligence collection through,
most obviously, interrogation, but also through monitoring conversations
among prisoners or even “turning” terrorist agents and sending them back
out as government informants. Governments usually justify publicly
counterterrorism detentions on incapacitation or disruption grounds, but no
doubt information-gathering was at the forefront of the Bush
72
administration’s detention policies, as demonstrated by the lengths to

Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313,
1316 (2000); Mark C. Stafford & Mark Warr, A Reconceptualization of General and
Specific Deterrence, 30 J. RESEARCH IN CRIME & DELINQUENCY 123–135 (1993).
70. See RICHARD A. POSNER, COUNTERING TERRORISM: BLURRED FOCUS, HALTING
STEPS 205 (2007).
71. See CABINET OFFICE, supra note 58, at 16 (“All disruption operations depend upon
the collection and exploitation of information and intelligence that helps identify terrorist
networks, including their membership, intentions, and means of operation.”).
72. The declaration by Defense Intelligence Agency Director Vice Admiral Lowell E.
Jacoby in the litigation involving alleged dirty-bomber Jose Padilla is especially
illuminating: “The United States is now engaged in a robust program of interrogating . . .
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which that Administration went to defend permissive interrogation
73
standards and CIA detention programs. “These are dangerous men with
unparalleled knowledge about terrorist networks and their plans for new
attacks,” explained President Bush in September 2006, in disclosing
publicly the CIA secret detention program. “The security of our nation and
the lives of our citizens depend on our ability to learn what these terrorists
74
know.”
This last point about facilitating information-gathering shows that there
are often synergies among the preventive approaches. Incapacitating
individuals suspected of posing serious dangers may deter individuals from
engaging in or supporting dangerous activities. Disrupting major plots and
interrogating the plotters may reveal a lot about how future schemes will be
hatched and who among the many dangerous individuals remaining at large
are most likely to play critical roles in those schemes. Any sound
counterterrorism strategy will combine all of these elements to some
75
degree.
But there are also tradeoffs among these elements of prevention. In
part this is due to the costs of detention, some of which are discussed
76
below. It also results from the fact that counterterrorism detention strategy
– and with it consideration of administrative detention’s utility in certain
circumstances – is formulated in an environment of constrained resources.
There are also, however, tensions among the preventive purposes of
detention and the means to achieve them. For example, the government can
monitor suspects’ movements and communications, not only to foresee and
forestall plots but to gain a more complete picture of the terrorist network
and its activities; but the moment the government detains someone, those
movements and communications may cease along with its ability to track
them. Releasing a captured individual still believed to pose a danger may
offer opportunities to follow him, perhaps with more to be gained through
information collection than the marginal risk of his committing major
violence. In other words, an aggressive incapacitation approach may
enemy combatants in the War on Terrorism. [They] hold critical information about our
enemy and its planned attacks against the United States that is vital to our national security.”
Declaration of Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby (USN) Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency at 6, Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02CV04445),
2002 WL 34342502.
73. See Scott Shane, David Johnston & James Risen, Secret U.S. Endorsement of
Severe Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007; at A1; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush Says
Interrogation Methods Aren’t Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2007, at A1.
74. President George W. Bush, Speech: President Discusses Creation of Military
Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html. See also Remarks by Attorney General Mukasey,
supra note 8. (“Detention often yields valuable intelligence about the intentions,
organization, operations, and tactics of our enemy.”).
75. See PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT: THE WARS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (2008); CABINET OFFICE, supra note 58.
76. See infra Part IV.
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As the U.K.
sometimes undermine information-gathering activities.
government’s Intelligence and Security Committee reported in its
examination of the 2005 London subway bombings, “[t]here is always a
difficult balance to strike between investigating those known to be a current
78
threat and working to discover other possible threats.”
In considering new detention laws, the critical question is therefore not
simply the utility of proposed legal authorities. It is their benefits and costs
compared to alternative available tools and in combination. That
assessment requires knowing more precisely whom the new laws would
detain, the subject of Part IV.
III. DETAIN WHOM?
Aside from clarifying the policy requirements motivating
administrative detention proposals – and therefore allowing better
comparison to existing legal tools – answering the why question helps guide
the substantive definition of the class subject to that detention. That is, the
answer to why administratively detain heavily determines whom specifically
to detain. Should Congress draw administrative detention laws targeting
those who pose a certain level and type of dangerousness? Or who
committed certain acts? Or who are members of certain designated terrorist
groups? Or who has information about others who are? This Part explores
how Congress might define the subject class, drawing on examples from
American law and anti-terrorism laws in other democracies.
One approach to new detention laws would simply continue using the
Bush administration’s notion of enemy combatancy as the relevant inquiry.
That is, recalling the definitions cited earlier, courts might be charged with
determining whether an individual is a “member” of a certain organization,
or has committed a “belligerent act,” or has “supported” those who are or
79
have. The government’s claim in Hamdi and Rasul notwithstanding, one
can certainly construct judicially manageable standards for any of these
80
inquiries. After all, these concepts have analogues in criminal law that
judges apply regularly (say, conspiracy liability in the case of membership

77. The case of the “Lackawanna 6” provides an illustration of how this tension
among priorities has played out in practice. Upon discovering a possible al Qaeda sleeper
cell outside Buffalo, New York, in 2002, some elements within the United States
Government favored immediate arrest while others favored surveillance. See Robert M.
Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of Prevention,
42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 40-44 (2005).
78. Quoted in CABINET OFFICE, supra note 58, at 17.
79. See supra Part I.
80. Indeed, this is what federal courts are now charged with doing with respect to
many Guantánamo detainees following Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008), sitting
as habeas courts reviewing the factual basis for detention. See Boumediene v. Bush, No. 041166 (RJL), 2008 WL 4722127 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2008).
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81

or aiding and abetting in the case of support).
Once free from the paradigmatic confines of the law of war, however, in
designing an administrative detention regime, enemy combatancy need not be
the starting point at all. After all, the traditional notion of enemy combatancy
grew out of a warfare context in which participation in an enemy army could
reasonably be assumed to serve as an accurate indicator of one’s future threat,
measured in traditional military terms. Even those who cling to a “war on
terror” paradigm acknowledge that the fight against terrorism generally or al
Qaeda in particular is unlike any previous war in terms of the nature of the
82
enemy, its threat, and the way we think about success. Moreover, it is widely
believed that since 2001 the terrorist threats to the United States and its allies
have become less centralized, less hierarchical, and less formalized, even
further complicating direct application of legal standards developed for fighting
83
traditional armies. There is a range of alternative ways to define the detention
class that may better fit the policy problem to be solved.
One model for defining the class might draw upon existing examples of
administrative detention in U.S. law, which permit the long-term detention of
certain categories of individuals judicially adjudged as “dangerous.” Some
state laws, for example, authorize the detention of charged or convicted sex
offenders who, due to a “mental abnormality,” are likely to engage in certain
84
acts of sexual violence. These statutory schemes might be a particularly apt
analogue because, as is often supposed about religiously extremist terrorists,
they were premised legislatively on a view that some sexual predators are
85
undeterrable from future violence. Under federal bail law, arrestees can
similarly be held pending trial upon sufficient showing that no release
86
conditions would reasonably assure community safety.
To be sure, it remains highly debatable whether dangerousness alone as
an administrative detention standard would pass constitutional muster, at
least with respect to U.S. citizens or those captured inside the United

81. See Robert Chesney & Jack Goldmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of
Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079 (2008).
82. See BOBBITT, supra note 75.
83. Although there exists a major debate among terrorism experts as to the continuing
strength of al Qaeda, even those who assess al Qaeda as resurgent acknowledge that
“informal local terrorist groups are certainly a critical part of the global terrorist network.”
Bruce Hoffmann, The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama bin Laden Still Matters,
FOREIGN AFF, May/June 2008; see also MARC SAGEMAN, LEADERLESS JIHAD: TERROR
NETWORKS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2008) (arguing that the major terrorist threat to
the United States and the West now comes from loose-knit local cells).
84. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
85. See id. at 351, 362-363. Another example is involuntary commitment of certain
mentally ill persons believed to be dangerous. In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979),
the Supreme Court held that to comport with Fourteenth Amendment due process in a civil
proceeding brought under state law to involuntarily commit in a mental hospital an
individual for an indefinite period only the clear and convincing evidence standard was
required.
86. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
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87

States. In Zadvydas v. Davis, for instance, the Court made clear that
indefinite administrative detention of a removable alien would raise
88
constitutional due process concerns, but the Court also noted that a
statutory scheme directed at suspected terrorists, in particular, might change
89
its analysis.
As in other areas of American law, an administrative
detention regime might include future dangerousness as at least one critical
element. And, accordingly, the central inquiry for courts – assuming
judicial review – might be to review the Executive’s dangerousness
assessment.
Instead of defining the detention category around dangerousness, a
statute might tie detention to membership or affiliation. Consider the Alien
Enemies Act, a statute enacted in 1798 and later amended, which declares:
Whenever there is a declared war between the United States and
any foreign nation or government . . . and the President makes
public proclamation of the event, all natives, citizens, denizens, or
subjects of the hostile nation or government, being of the age of
fourteen years and upward, who shall be within the United States
and not actually naturalized, shall be liable to be apprehended,
90
restrained, secured, and removed as alien enemies.
91

In Ludecke v. Watkins, the Supreme Court upheld the Act’s World
War II implementation, which occurred via a presidential directive calling
for detention and removal of all alien enemies “who shall be deemed by the
Attorney General to be dangerous to the public pea[c]e and safety of the
92
United States.”
The statute, which remains on the books today, was
clearly premised on the idea that during wartime an individual’s citizenship
of an enemy state is a strong indicator of threat.
The United Kingdom’s 2005 Prevention of Terrorism Act, as another
model, allows for the imposition of “control orders” (or restrictions on an
individual’s movements, communications, or other freedoms) based on past
or present activities. It authorizes control orders when the government “has
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the individual is or has been
involved in terrorism-related activity,” which is further defined as:
87. The complex constitutional issues are beyond the scope of this paper, but of course
they are highly relevant and any administrative detention scheme would face intense judicial
challenge. Throughout this paper I cite a number of U.S. federal and state preventive
detention laws that have been upheld, though usually on very narrow grounds. For a view
skeptical of the constitutionality of preventive detention laws related to terrorism, see Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554-557 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
89. See id. at 691.
90. 50 U.S.C. §21 (2006) (originally enacted as Alien Enemies Act of 1798, ch. 66, 1
Stat. 577).
91. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948).
92. See id. at 163.
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(a) the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism;
(b) conduct which facilitates the commission, preparation or
instigation of such acts, or which is intended to do so; (c) conduct
which gives encouragement to the commission, preparation or
instigation of such acts, or which is intended to do so; (d) conduct
which gives support or assistance to individuals who are known or
93
believed to be involved in terrorism-related activity.
Under this model, the critical review inquiry for courts focuses not on an
individualized assessment of future dangerousness or membership but on
whether an individual committed certain acts. Parliament likely selected
these types of acts because they were believed to serve as a good indicator
94
of future dangerousness.
As yet another set of models, consider two Israeli administrative
detention schemes, one tied to a showing of necessity and another to
showing dangerousness-plus. Under one statutory scheme, its domestic
“Emergency Powers Law,” the Executive can order judicially reviewed
detention based on the extremely broad standard of “reasonable cause to
believe that reasons of state security or public security require that a
95
particular person be detained.” This does not presuppose a state of war,
and it contrasts with Israel’s Unlawful Enemy Combatant statute, a law
passed in 2002 following the Israeli Supreme Court’s concerns over the
detention of Hezbollah fighters’ family members as bargaining chips. The
96
new statute, recently upheld by the Israeli Supreme Court, provides
authority to detain certain individuals fighting on behalf of foreign forces
with which Israel regards itself in a state of armed conflict. Pursuant to
strict judicial review requirements, the statute authorizes detention of
someone who “participated either directly or indirectly in hostile acts
against the State of Israel or is a member of a force perpetrating hostile acts
97
against the State of Israel” and whose “release will harm State security.”
In other words, detention under the latter scheme requires a showing of
either certain acts or membership plus dangerousness.
The 2001 USA PATRIOT Act contains provisions authorizing the
short-term detention of aliens on grounds similar to many of these previous

93. Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, ch. 2, §§1-2 (Eng.), available at http://www.
opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2005/ukpga_20050002_en_1.
94. See CABINET OFFICE, supra note 58, at 17-18.
95. Emergency Powers (Detention) Law (EPDL), 5739-1979, S.H. 76, 33 L.S.I. 89-92
(Isr. 1979). See generally Administrative Detention: The Legal Basis for Administrative
Detention, Israeli Law, http://www.btselem.org/English/Administrative_Detention/Israeli_
Law.asp .
96. See CrimA 6659/06 Anonymous v. State of Israel [2008] (S. Ct. Isr.), available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/06/590/066/n04/06066590.n04.pdf.
97. Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762-2002 (Isr.), available at 32
ISRAELI Y.B. HUM. RTS. 389 (2002) and at http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/7E86D0
98-0463-4F37-A38D-8AEBE770BDE6/0/IncarcerationLawedited140302.doc.
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examples. It gives the Attorney General power to detain, among others,
any alien whom he has reason to believe is “likely to engage after entry in
any terrorist activity,” has “incited terrorist activity,” is a “representative”
or “member” of a terrorist organization, or “has received military-type
98
training” from a terrorist organization.
The Act also authorizes the
Attorney General to detain aliens who are “engaged in any other activity
99
that endangers the national security of the United States.”
These examples are intended to show just a partial range of possible
definitions of the detention class, any of which is susceptible to judicial
application. So which one makes sense: A broad “state security” class?
Dangerousness?
Membership?
Commission of proscribed acts?
Knowledge? The answer depends heavily on strategic purpose.
If, for example, the overwhelming focus of administrative detention is
to incapacitate individuals likely to pursue threatening terrorist activities
(and perhaps to deter others), then the authority to detain would most
naturally turn on an individual’s supposed dangerousness. In that regard, a
statutory scheme might resemble administrative detention laws mentioned
above, aimed at supposedly very dangerous sex offenders whose prison
term has expired or pre-trial arrestees. Or the scheme might rely on proxy
indicators of dangerousness, as the Israeli Unlawful Enemy Combatant
100
statute does, to further restrict and refine the dangerousness inquiry. The
Israeli Supreme Court, in upholding the statute, explained its incapacitation
purpose in the following terms:
[W]e are dealing with an administrative detention whose purpose is
to protect state security by removing from the cycle of hostilities
anyone who is a member of a terrorist organization or who is taking
part in the organization’s operations against the State of Israel, in
view of the threat that he represents to the security of the state and
101
the lives of its inhabitants.
The incapacitation purpose of the U.K.’s 2005 Prevention of Terrorism Act
control order provisions is likewise clear from its text, which states that “for
the purposes [of the U.K. statute] it is immaterial whether the acts of
terrorism in question are specific acts of terrorism or acts of terrorism
102
generally.”

98. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, §412(a), Pub. L. No. 10756, 115 Stat. 272, 350-352 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §1226a (2006)); 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(3)(A)(B) (2006).
99. 8 U.S.C. §1226a(a)(3)(B).
100. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
101. State of Israel, at ¶15.
102. Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, ch. 2, §1(9) (Eng.).
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If, by contrast, the emphasis of administrative detention is not to
incapacitate individuals but to disrupt impending plots, then the focus of
authority to detain might be cast differently – in some ways more narrowly
but in some ways perhaps more broadly. A 2007 Senate bill, known as the
National Security with Justice Act, for instance, sought to authorize
detention on a showing that “failure to detain that [international terrorist]
will result in a risk of imminent death or imminent serious bodily injury to
any individual or imminent damage to or destruction of any United States
103
facility.”
On the one hand, in theory disruption can be achieved by
nabbing only key leaders and planners and those directly involved in a
specific plot; even if some very dangerous but peripherally involved
associates remain free, the scheme may be ruined. On the other hand,
detention to disrupt might be thought to justify detaining for some period of
time even individuals who are not dangerous at all (perhaps not very
committed to the terrorist cause nor capable of doing much harm) but who
104
play a role in a particular plot or might just have information about it.
The key inquiry in the last example is different from an inquiry about
incapacitation: detention to disrupt assumes a functional linkage between an
individual and a plot (or set of plots), whereas incapacitation looks to an
individual’s general will and capacity to do harm. A statutory regime
focused on disruption would accordingly define the class around plots or a
showing that “but for” detention of a particular individual, terrorist attacks
are likely. There will often be some overlap of these categories, but not
always. Consider, for example, a terrorist financier who funds several
terrorist organizations. The government may regard him as extremely
dangerous and might believe that detaining him would reduce generally the
likelihood and effectiveness of future terrorist attacks (incapacitation) and
would frighten others from funding terrorism (deterrence). But he is
unlikely to be covered by a law requiring a showing that failure to detain
him would substantially increase the risk of a specific, imminent attack.
Consider then, as an example running the other direction, a terrorist
organization’s courier believed to be carrying messages to its members
about an impending attack: measured against a standard of dangerousness,
he might fall outside an incapacitation-detention law. But his specific
involvement in an imminent attack might put him squarely within a law
aimed at disruption.
If the major focus of administrative detention is information-gathering,
the logical definition of the detention class would change again.
Administrative detention might target individuals believed to have critical
information about either terrorism threats generally or, more narrowly,
specific terrorism plots. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the U.S.
103. National Security with Justice Act, S.1876, 110th Cong. §105(a)(1) (2007).
104. See infra notes 142-143 and accompanying text. As explained further below,
disruption detention along these lines also points toward a short duration of detention,
whereas dangerousness detention may in some cases point toward long-term detention.
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government relied – amid much controversy and criticism – on the federal
material witness statute, which under certain imperative circumstances
allows arrest of an individual with information critical to a criminal
105
proceeding.
An administrative detention system might similarly define
106
detention authority in relation to an individual’s supposed knowledge.
Again, often this category of individuals will overlap with inquiries of
dangerousness or involvement in specific plots, and a law might require a
showing of membership in a terrorist organization or commission of a
terrorist act as a threshold matter before even considering the information
question. But these categories will not always overlap. Consider, for
example, an al Qaeda paymaster who might not be individually very
dangerous but who might have substantial information about associates
who are. Taken to the extreme, a law authorizing detention based on
suspected knowledge alone might be used to justify holding the spouse or
roommate of a suspected terrorist – even if not complicit – in order to
question that individual about the suspect’s actions, communications, and
intentions.
In sum, the strategic priorities behind administrative detention
proposals will guide how the substantive class should be defined. But, one
might ask, if we need new tools to combat terrorism effectively, why not
simply define the class broadly – as the Bush administration did – to give
the Executive maximum flexibility? The Executive could then expand and
contract the administrative detention class as needed to balance security and
liberty. Part IV explains why not.
IV. RESTRICTING WHY AND WHOM
107

As noted earlier, the Bush administration argued that broad detention
authorities are needed for the entire range of reasons listed above –
including incapacitation, deterrence, disruption, and information-gathering
– and it therefore fought for an expansive definition of the “enemy

105. See 18 U.S.C. §3144 (2000). For critical accounts of its use after 9/11, see HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, WITNESS TO ABUSE: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES UNDER THE MATERIAL
WITNESS LAW SINCE SEPTEMBER 11 (2005), http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2005/06/26/
witness-abuse.
106. See COLE & LOBEL, supra note 21, at 250. According to then-retired Judge
Michael B. Mukasey:
The [material witness] statute was used frequently after 9/11, when the
government tried to investigate numerous leads and people to determine whether
follow-on attacks were planned – but found itself without a statute that authorized
investigative detention on reasonable suspicion, of the sort available to authorities
in Britain and France, among other countries. And so, the U.S. government
subpoenaed and arrested on a material witness warrant those like Padilla who
seemed likely to have information.
Mukasey, supra note 52.
107. See supra Parts I-II.
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108

combatants” detention class. Even if one rejects the full breadth of the
Bush administration’s argument, the notion is certainly correct that all the
elements of prevention listed above feature in any overall counterterrorism
109
strategy.
The main reason for narrowing the class – for restricting the definition
of those liable to be administratively detained – is that every expansion
comes at a price. This brings us back to the need to consider carefully
strategic priorities.
The policy calculus must include consideration not just of the general
dangers attached to enacting any new detention regime but the marginal
dangers that come from expanding the size and shape of the susceptible
class. A full discussion of all of those dangers is beyond the scope of this
article, but it is worth highlighting several of the most significant ones
because they are relevant to the article’s broader point: that the ultimate
policy merits of administrative detention will turn at least as much on the
issue of defining the substantive class as on fashioning the right procedures.
Debates about administrative detention are usually cast in terms of
110
liberty versus security. But administrative detention – both its use as well
as its mere enactment – carries risks to both liberty and security.
Experiences of the U.S. and allied governments since September 2001
suggest that those costs are unlikely to be mitigated even by robust
procedural protections without also constraining tightly the substantive
detention criteria, and those experiences offer valuable lessons that should
guide the definition of any administrative class.
Administrative detention opponents justifiably argue that creating new
mechanisms for detention with diluted procedural protections (compared to
111
the procedural features of American criminal justice) puts liberty at risk.
The most obvious liberty concern is that innocent individuals will get swept
up and imprisoned – the “false positive” problem. Civil libertarians rightly
worry, too, that aside from the specific risk to particular individuals, any
expansion of administrative detention (I say “expansion” because, as noted
earlier, administrative detention already exists in some nonterrorist contexts
112
in American law) risks more generally eroding checks on state power. To
some the idea of administrative detention for suspected terrorists is the kind
of “loaded weapon” that Justice Jackson worried about at the time of

108. In the course of the Padilla litigation, for example, the Government asserted each
of them. Brief of Petitioner at 28-38, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 031027), 2004 WL 542777.
109. See, e.g., CABINET OFFICE, supra note 58 (explaining the U.K. government’s use of
each of them).
110. See generally ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE:
SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS (2007).
111. See Roth, supra note 4; Ratner, supra note 5, Zabel & Benjamin, supra note 4; A
CRITIQUE OF “NATIONAL SECURITY COURTS,” supra note 4.
112. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
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113

Furthermore, even if we are satisfied that the U.S.
Korematsu.
government can use administrative detention responsibly, there are many
unsavory foreign governments that might exploit the precedent for
repressive purposes. We need, therefore, to be cautious about justifying
principles that could be used pretextually by less democratic regimes to
crack down, for example, on dissidents they might label “terrorists” or
114
“national security threats.”
In safeguarding liberty against such risks, the discussion usually shifts
quickly to the procedural protections afforded suspects (such as assistance
of counsel and strict rules of evidence) or the burdens of proof placed on
the government (such as probable cause, or beyond a reasonable doubt).
But the substantive definition of the detention class is key to managing
these risks as well, and without narrowing the class, even robust procedural
protections will fail.
Some relatively narrow definitions – for instance, for those who
commit certain acts – might generally be provable to great certainty,
whereas some very broad ones – say, for those who harbor devotion to a
hostile ideology – may be impossible to prove to a high certainty. A very
broad definition of “conduct” or “dangerousness” justifying detention will
also likely result in rounding up many suspects who would not actually
have engaged in terrorist conduct. Indeed, that a broad substantive
definition of the detention class can overwhelm even the most robust
procedural protections is reflected in criticisms of recently expanded
criminal liability for providing “material support” to terrorist organizations
or engaging in terrorist conspiracies. Federal criminal statutes have been
used to prosecute individuals for membership in terrorist organizations or
for participating in terrorist conspiracies even when no specific terrorist plot
115
could be shown.
Civil libertarians charge that these prosecutions have
netted many individuals who were actually unlikely to engage in serious
116
acts of terrorism.
As to the issue of how administrative detention will be perceived and
used internationally, a narrow set of definitional criteria – requiring, for
example, a showing of certain specific acts or a linkage to specific plots –
stands a better chance of winning legitimacy among allies and averting

113. See Ratner, supra note 5. In his dissent in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 246 (1944), Justice Jackson warned that by validating repressive actions taken under
emergency, “[t]he principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.”
114. See LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COST OF COUNTERTERRORISM: POWER, POLITICS,
AND LIBERTY 121 (2008); DEBORAH PEARLSTEIN & PRITI PATEL, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST,
BEHIND THE WIRE: AN UPDATE TO ENDING SECRET DETENTIONS 24-25 (2005), http://www.
humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/PDF/ behind-the-wire-033005.pdf .
115. See Chesney & Goldmith, supra note 81, at 1101-1106.
116. COLE & LOBEL, supra note 21, at 49.
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Although
overly expansive interpretations among other countries.
creating any new category of administrative detention risks chipping away
at international norms that generally demand criminal prosecution to lock
away bad actors, the more narrowly such a carve-out is defined the less
prone it will be to political manipulation or to further stretching to deal with
other types of public policy problems.
Besides these liberty risks, administrative detention carries costs and
risks from a security standpoint. Again, the substantive criteria of detention
law may help mitigate these risks.
Historically, detention practices – especially those viewed as overbroad
– have sometimes proven counterproductive in combating terrorism and
radicalization, and consideration of administrative detention’s strategic
utility should weigh these dangers. The British government learned
painfully that internment of suspected Northern Ireland terrorists was
viewed among Northern Irish communities as a form of collective
punishment that fueled violent nationalism, and detention helped dry up
118
community informants. And in Iraq and Afghanistan, though exceptional
cases because combat still rages there, detention has played an important
role in neutralizing threats to coalition forces but has also contributed to
anti-coalition radicalization, especially when perceived as being applied
119
overbroadly.
Overbroad detention sweeps risk further radicalizing and
alienating communities from which terrorists are likely to emerge or whose
120
assistance is vital in penetrating or discerning extremist groups.
Moreover, several influential studies of counterterrorism strategy have
emphasized the need to target coercive policies (including military and law
enforcement efforts) narrowly and precisely to avoid playing into al Qaeda
propaganda efforts to aggregate local grievances into a common global
121
Official U.S. military doctrine now cautions about similar
movement.
122
risks in setting up detention systems in battling insurgencies.

117. See Hakimi, supra note 55.
118. See DAVID BONNER, EXECUTIVE MEASURES, TERRORISM AND NATIONAL SECURITY,
87-96 (2007); DONOHUE, supra note 114 at 36-48; Tom Parker, Counterterrorism Policies in
the United Kingdom, in PROTECTING LIBERTY IN AN AGE OF TERROR, supra note 42,
Appendix A, at 119, 125-128.
119. See Carlotta Gall, U.S.-Afghan Foray Reveals Friction on Antirebel Raids, N.Y.
TIMES, July 3, 2006, at A9; Alissa J. Rubin, U.S. Remakes Jails in Iraq, but Gains Are at
Risk, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2008, at A1. The new U.S. military counterinsurgency manual
offers similar cautions. COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL NO. 3-24, at ¶1-132 (2006),
available at http://usacac.army.mil/cac/repository/materials/coin-fm3-24.pdf.
120. See infra note 134 and accompanying text; see also Pearlstein, supra note 4
(arguing that even if valid under U.S. and international law, preventive detention schemes
are counterproductive in combating terrorism).
121. See, e.g., Audrey Kurth Cronin, How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of
Terrorist Groups, INT’L SECURITY, Summer 2006 (31:1), at 7, available at http://www.
mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2006.31.1.7; David Kilcullen, Countering Global
Insurgency, 28 J. STRATEGIC STUDIES 597 (2005).
122. See COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 119, at ¶¶7-38, 7-40, 8-42.
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Narrow definitional criteria can therefore help in mitigating an
Executive’s propensity to over-detain. Observers from both the right and
the left worry correctly that in the face of terrorist threats the Executive is
likely to push detention powers to or even past their legal outer boundaries
in order to prevent catastrophe as well as head off accusatory political
123
backlash for having failed to take sufficient action.
These are
fundamentally policy problems, not legal problems, and will require sound
Executive judgments no matter what the legal regime looks like. But once
the role of detention is firmly situated in a broader counterterrorism strategy
that seeks to balance the many competing policy priorities, a carefully
drawn administrative detention statute might help restrain this propensity
toward short-term overreach with long-term strategic drawbacks.
Considering these liberty and security risks in relation to the four
124
preventive purposes outlined above, the process of narrowing the class
subject to proposed administrative detention laws should begin by
excluding deterrence or information-gathering as the dominant strategic
driver.
Although both have important roles to play in overall
125
counterterrorism strategy, the costs of defining detention authority around
them are likely too high to bear given the alternatives and expected
benefits.
As for deterrence, virtually any very dangerous terrorist or terrorism
supporter the government could target with a deterrence detention strategy
would either be so committed to violent extremism as to render the
126
marginal threat of administrative detention negligible or would be
deterred already by the threat of criminal prosecution or military attack
127
(even discounted by a low probability of apprehension).
The publicity
and martyrdom imagery surrounding detention might even make it seem
appealing to some individuals or groups.
As for information-gathering, an administrative detention law premised
on detaining individuals with valuable knowledge independent of an
individual’s nefarious activities sets a precedent too easily overused or
128
abused at home or abroad.
Information-gathering, including through
123. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 44-51 (2006); GOLDSMITH, supra note 12, at 116, 189190. For a historical account of the British “over-detention” phenomenon during World War
II, see A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, IN THE HIGHEST DEGREE ODIOUS: DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL
IN WARTIME BRITAIN (1992).
124. See supra Part II.
125. See BOAZ GANOR, THE COUNTER-TERRORISM PUZZLE: A GUIDE FOR DECISION
MAKERS 47-100 (2005).
126. See JESSICA STERN, THE ULTIMATE TERRORISTS 130-131 (1999).
127. In upholding Israel’s Unlawful Enemy Combatant statute, the Israeli Supreme
Court noted that deterring others from committing acts is not a legitimate purpose of
administrative detention. CrimA 6659/06 Anonymous v. State of Israel [2008] (S. Ct. Isr.) at
¶18, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/06/590/066/n04/06066590.n04.pdf.
128. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 105.
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lawful interrogation, will no doubt be a strong motivating objective behind
almost any administrative detention scheme, and an individual’s knowledge
about terrorist operations or planning could be a reason not to release
someone otherwise validly detained (i.e., someone held on grounds
129
independent of knowledge). But using a person’s suspected knowledge
alone as the basis for detention and completely delinking detention from an
individual’s voluntary and purposeful actions cuts even deeper than most
other administrative detention into traditional civil liberties principles and
130
safeguards.
Even in interpreting Congress’s September 2001
authorization for the use of military force to include implicitly the power to
detain “enemy combatants,” the Supreme Court pulled back when it came
to information-gathering, noting that “[c]ertainly we agree that indefinite
131
detention for the purpose of interrogation is not authorized.”
Furthermore, a detention law that allows incarceration based on knowledge
might very well deter individuals with important information from coming
forward voluntarily to the government. Because local community members
are often best able to discern the affiliations and intentions of terrorists or
militants embedded in their communities, individual tips are critical to
132
identifying genuine threats otherwise invisible among populations.
Incapacitation and disruption are likely to be more effective and
legitimate strategic bases for new administrative detention laws, though
133
information-gathering is likely to be an important secondary benefit. As
noted earlier, opponents of administrative detention argue that criminal law
and other non-detention tools are adequate to incapacitate or disrupt the
activities of most individuals whom the government would reasonably feel
compelled to target, while proponents of administrative detention insist that
134
the risk of some terrorists slipping through that net is too high. Much of
this debate comes down to differing assessments of the marginal danger
posed by that remainder. But, significantly, even opponents of new
administrative schemes acknowledge that stopping an individual from
carrying out a terrorist attack (as opposed to merely acquiring information
135
or to instill fear) is a legitimate purpose of detention. The dispute is over
129. Opponents of administrative detention will argue that detention, outside of
criminal prosecution, even based on activities or threat is still too broad and prone to abuse.
See COLE & LOBEL, supra note 21, at 47-50.
130. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004). On the other hand, one might
argue that in some extreme emergency cases liberty concerns should give way to
information requirements, especially if there are no alternative means to involuntary
interrogation available.
131. Id. at 521.
132. See DONOHUE, supra note 114, at 28; Renee De Nevers, Modernizing the Geneva
Conventions, 29 WASH. Q. 99, 106 (2006). For discussions of this phenomenon in the United
Kingdom, see Christopher Caldwell, Counterterrorism in the U.K.: After Londonistan, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 2006, §6 (Magazine), at 42.
133. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., COLE & LOBEL, supra note 21, at 251-252.
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what factual predicate is required and what standards and processes the
136
state must utilize to substantiate them.
Part V brings this discussion back to these procedural issues. This still
leaves the question of how, more precisely, Congress should define the
susceptible detention class in considering an administrative detention
system. The ultimate merits of various definitional approaches – such as
membership, past acts, future dangerousness, or some combination thereof
– cannot be discerned and calculated independent of the processes and
standards of proof with which they are paired. But recent experience and
some judgments about the future threat of terrorism help narrow the range
of sensible choices.
Part III offered some models drawn from other countries with long
histories of combating terrorism and from other U.S. laws premised on
incapacitation. That section further explained that an incapacitation
strategy points naturally toward a future dangerousness approach to
defining the class, though proxies such as past acts or membership might
137
form part of the inquiry.
Indeed, requiring some showing of an
individual’s terrorist activity in addition to indications of future
dangerousness has the advantage of tying detention more tightly with
138
individual moral culpability, though this carries the corresponding
disadvantage of intruding more directly into the traditional province of
criminal law. If one thinks that the number of (or threat posed by)
dangerous terrorists who cannot be prosecuted through criminal trials is
high, an incapacitation strategic rationale of administrative detention makes
sense. But the U.S. experience at Guantánamo, for example, casts some
doubt on the ability of the government to assess individual dangerousness
very accurately: On the one hand the government brought many supposedly
136. An additional worry among administrative detention critics is that building a
detention system outside the criminal justice system with reduced evidentiary and procedural
requirements might dramatically undercut the incentive for the government to use
prosecution. This concern is valid, though the benefits of justice and finality as well as
bureaucratic interests might mitigate it. An administrative detention regime might also build
in a requirement that the government show that prosecution is impracticable. The British
House of Lords considered this issue in Home Department v. E [2007] UKHL 47, at ¶¶1416, as both the court and the British government read the control order statute as requiring a
presumption that prosecution will be used when possible.
137. A great deal of scholarship has focused on the use of individual dangerousness
assessments in American criminal law and other legal contexts, and the limitations of the
government’s ability to predict it accurately. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE
UNPROVABLE: THE ROLE OF LAW, SCIENCE, AND SPECULATION IN ADJUDICATING
CULPABILITY AND DANGEROUSNESS (2006); Jeffrey Fagan & Martin Guggenheim,
Preventive Detention and the Judicial Prediction of Dangerousness for Juveniles: A Natural
Experiment, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415 (1996); Norval Morris & Marc Miller,
Predictions of Dangerousness, 6 CRIME & JUSTICE 1 (1985); Jonathan Simon, Reversal of
Fortune: The Resurgence of Individual Risk Assessment in Criminal Justice, 2005 ANN.
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 397.
138. See COLE & LOBEL, supra note 21, at 47-50.
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dangerous individuals to Guantánamo who were then released because they
were later believed not to pose much threat after all; on the other hand,
some of those released have turned out to be quite dangerous, and have
139
reengaged in terrorist activity. A key question for those advocating new
administrative detention proposals for incapacitation is whether accurate
dangerousness assessments are realistic and what would be necessary to
improve them.
A disruption strategy points naturally toward including a “but for”
standard of dangerousness. That is, the government would have to show
that unless the individual is detained, a terrorist attack is likely, perhaps
140
very likely. Such an approach might effectively limit the detainable class
to individuals who are either tied to specific plots or are highly central to a
terrorist organization’s planning. An advantage of this approach is that it
would probably be less prone to false positives or overbroad detention than
a strategy based on dangerousness (depending, of course, on exactly how
the standard is drawn), because the government would have to show
evidence not only about the suspect but about his involvement in imminent
or impending terrorist activities. A corresponding disadvantage is that such
a detention system would be severely limited by intelligence – specifically,
the ability to link individuals to plotting or specific plots in advance. One
might also reasonably ask why, if the government is so confident it knows
who is about to perpetrate a terrorist scheme, can it not arrest and prosecute
the plotters? A disruption approach to administrative detention makes
sense if one believes there is a significant or significantly dangerous set of
individuals for whom the government is likely to have sufficient
information to link them to such plotting or plots, yet is also likely to have
insufficient admissible evidence to support timely use of criminal justice to
141
stop them.
Both of these definitional approaches – assessments of individual
dangerousness and showing that an attack is likely to occur without
administrative detention – look very different from the one based on enemy
combatancy, certainly as the government has interpreted and used it since

139. On releases from Guantánamo following later determinations that an individual
was not an “enemy combatant,” see Press Briefing, Gordon England, Secretary of the Navy,
Briefing on Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 9, 2004), available at http://www.
defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2777. For a specific example of an
allegedly mistaken detention at Guantánamo, see Carol D. Leonnig, Evidence of Innocence
Rejected at Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2007, at A1. On detainees released from
Guantánamo later returning to terrorism, see Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Former
Guantanamo Detainees Who Have Returned to the Fight (July 12, 2007), available at http://
www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/DOD_fmrGitmo.pdf; Alissa J. Rubin,
Former Guantanamo Detainee Tied to Mosul Suicide Attack, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2008, at
A8.
140. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
141. See the discussion of the limits of criminal prosecutions in dealing with terrorism,
supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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142

2001. Indeed, once freed from the need to cast detention in terms of the
law of war and traditional war powers, past experience and the logic
underlying most administrative detention proposals caution against using
“membership” in or “support” for a particular enemy organization or set of
organizations as the key factual predicate in defining the class.
A definitional approach such as enemy combatancy, based on
membership or support to a particular enemy like al Qaeda, is likely to be
both too broad and too narrow. As stated earlier, the main reason modern
forms of terrorism are believed by administrative detention advocates to
require new detention laws is that the catastrophic harms of attacks require
recalibrating the balance struck by criminal law between security and
protection of innocents. A “membership” or “support” approach to
administrative detention has already proven prone to overuse against
individuals who, while perhaps individually dangerous, pose little or no
143
threat of major terrorist attack.
An agency requirement – does the
individual operate under the effective control of an organization? – makes
more sense, and actually has more in common with traditional notions of
144
enemy combatancy than does mere membership or support. At the same
time, if the ultimate concern is stopping major future terrorist attacks
(which administrative detention proponents worry will grow more lethal), it
seems odd to restrict the targeting of administrative detention powers to
intended perpetrators who are affiliated with groups involved in the
September 2001 attacks. This is especially true if al Qaeda and other
terrorist organizations are likely to become less centralized and more
145
dispersed, and if massively destructive technologies are likely to become
146
more available to them.
An alternative approach would have Congress
designate on an ongoing basis which terrorist organizations pose sufficient

142. As mentioned earlier, the Combatant Status Review Tribunals at Guantánamo
define “enemy combatant” as:
An individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaida forces, or
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its
coalition partners. This includes any person who has committed a belligerent act
or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.
Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal, supra note 26, at ¶a.
143. And, as explained earlier, it may inadvertently play into the hands of al Qaeda
propaganda efforts. See supra notes 118-122 and accompanying text.
144. Judge Wilkinson adopts a similar interpretation of “enemy combatant” in Al-Marri
v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 244 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (concurring in part and dissenting
in part), when he reasons that to be classified as an enemy combatant a person must “(1) be a
member of (2) an organization or nation against whom Congress has declared war or
authorized the use of military force, and (3) knowingly plans or engages in conduct that
harms or aims to harm persons or property for the purpose of furthering the military goals of
the enemy nation or organization.” See supra note 23 (describing the Supreme Court’s
March 6, 2009, order directing that Al-Marri be dismissed as moot).
145. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
146. See BOBBITT, supra note 75, at 446-452, 478-480.
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threats that their members – or, better, their agents – are subject to the
147
administrative detention statute.
The key point is that whether proposed administrative detention laws
aim primarily at long-term incapacitation or immediate-term disruption, a
more effective definitional approach would tie the target class quite directly
to the specific strategic aim by including, for example, a high substantive
standard of prospective or “but for” dangerousness. This could include
additional proxy indicators or required congressional designations likely to
improve the accuracy of adjudications and to check reflexive expansion of
148
the target class.
V. FROM WHY AND WHOM TO HOW
Having considered the issue of whom new legal powers might aim to
detain, any consideration of administrative detention statutes should be
grounded in a firm conception of “why detain?” because that strategic
rationale will inform significantly the logic of procedural design – the how
issues.
Near the outset we noted that there is an emerging consensus among
administrative detention reform advocates around a set of minimum
procedural and institutional elements found in most proposals: judicial
149
review, adversarial process, and transparency.
After Boumediene, it is
also fairly clear that robust judicial review and opportunity to contest the
legal and factual basis for detention are also constitutionally required, at
150
least for detainees held inside the United States and those at Guantánamo.
Beyond identifying such minimum elements, however, it is difficult to
work out the secondary details of procedural design without knowing more
precisely what a new administrative detention scheme aims to achieve and
147. David Cole offers a formula along similar lines, suggesting that Congress could
authorize and regulate law-of-war preventive detention for fighters only of those terrorist
groups against which Congress has expressly acknowledged a state of armed conflict. See
Cole, supra note 52. Some might argue that the 2001 Authorization of the Use of Military
Force did just that with respect to al Qaeda. Specifically, it authorized “all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons [the President] determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”
2001 Authorization of the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, §2(a), 115 Stat. 224.
Congress could pass additional resolutions to take account of new threats or repeal
resolutions to take account of diminished threats.
148. Besides these definitional standards themselves, there are other ways to restrict the
class of individuals susceptible to new administrative laws. Detention of an individual might
require an additional showing of prior terrorism-related acts, or it might require showing that
less-coercive means than detention could not alleviate the risk. The more such protections
are added, however, the less useful administrative detention becomes over other legal tools
like criminal prosecution.
149. See supra Part I.
150. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
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whom it is built to detain. Greater strategic clarity and a sharper idea of
how the substantive detention class might be defined therefore enlighten
this procedural discussion and reveal important additional questions of
institutional design.
Consider first the issue of judicial review combined with adversarial
process. The U.S. legal system generally exalts these features because they
151
are believed to promote both fairness and accuracy. Whatever the test or
factual predicate used to justify detention as part of a counterterrorism
strategy (dangerousness? proximity to a plot? knowledge of terrorist
activities? something else?), effective administrative detention ought to
involve adjudicative mechanisms likely to produce accurate and fair
determinations of that particular factual predicate.
If, for example, the dominant strategic purpose is incapacitation and the
critical detention test is therefore dangerousness, we should strive for
hearings designed to assess and predict accurately future behavior, with
adjudicators who have access to information relevant to that inquiry and
processes that effectively test the quality of that specific sort of
152
information.
True, regular federal judges make similar dangerousness
determinations based on adversarial hearings all the time (take the example
153
cited above of bail conditions while awaiting trial).
But terrorist
dangerousness is different from criminal dangerousness in both kind and
154
degree and requires understanding not just an individual’s probable
151. See Jay Sterling Silver, Equality of Arms and the Adversarial Process: A New
Constitutional Right, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1007, 1008 (“our system of justice is founded on the
presumption that the truth is more likely to emerge from the contest between zealous
advocates”). This argument formed the basis of opposition to some provisions in the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, Title X, §1005(e), 119 Stat. 2680,
2741-2743 (2005) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. §2241(2) (West Supp. 2008)),
restricting habeas corpus jurisdiction at Guantánamo. See, e.g., P. Sabin Willett, Detainees
Deserve Court Trials, Op-Ed., WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2005, at A21. But others observe that
adversarial process may sometimes suppress truth-finding. See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, The
Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1036 (1975) (“many of the
rules and devices of adversary litigation as we conduct it are not geared for, but are often
aptly suited to defeat, the development of the truth”); Frank J. Macciarola, Finding the Truth
in an American Criminal Trial: Some Observations, 5 CARDOZO J. INTL & COMP. L. 97
(1997) (observing that the American criminal justice system often subordinates truth to other
values).
152. Procedural due process cases are illustrative here. Compare, e.g., Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (requiring evidentiary hearings in situation where veracity and
credibility of claimants is key), with Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (refusing to require
judicial-style hearings for certain juvenile civil commitments because they were unlikely to
improve practice of relying on medical expert submissions).
153. Cf. Salerno v. United States, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (noting that right to counsel
and adversarial process mandated in the Bail Reform Act were “specifically designed to
further the accuracy of [the] determination [of the likelihood of future dangerousness]”).
154. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. Those who believe that terrorism
should be treated as crime may disagree with this point, but other ways in which terrorist
dangerousness generally differs from criminal dangerousness include its strategic purpose,
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activities and the magnitude of his threat but how his activities relate to
fellow terrorists’ activities. If the dangerousness test includes a further
inquiry into whether less liberty-restrictive means can mitigate the threat (as
155
the British Lords have required of recent British counterterrorism laws),
courts would further need to inquire of and assess the effectiveness of an
array of government tools, including monitoring and surveillance and
international cooperative efforts. These latter inquiries seem better suited
to a specialized court (perhaps a “national security court”), so that judges
can accumulate experience and expertise in these technical and operational
156
matters.
The same is probably true for disruption detention decisions,
which would require judicial understanding of functional linkages between
a suspect and terrorist organizations, as well as judicial decisionmaking
under extreme time pressures. The success of France’s counterterrorism
efforts is sometimes credited in part to its development of a specialized,
centralized terrorism court, because that country allowed its magistrates to
become “the type of expert on the subject of terrorism that is difficult to
157
create within normal judicial institutions.”
If, by contrast, the substantive standard for incapacitation detention is
not future dangerousness itself but whether a suspect committed certain acts
or is a member of a particular group (perhaps as proxies for dangerousness),
this again starts to look very much like an inquiry that regular courts
ordinarily conduct, using common analytical tools and types of evidence,
though perhaps with special provisions for classified information. There is
little reason why an act or membership inquiry could not be handled as
effectively by regular, generalist judges as by a special court.
In similar ways the choice among strategic imperatives behind
administrative detention points to different approaches to attorney
158
assistance.
The nature of information used to prove or disprove the
urgent need for detention in a disruption or information-gathering regime
individual motivation, and long-term as well as short-term consequences.
155. A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2005] 2 A.C. 68, 102-111 (H.L.).
156. See Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 3; Kenneth Anderson, Law and Terror,
POLICY REV., Oct. 2006, at 1.
157. Jeremy Shapiro & Benedicte Suzan, The French Experience of CounterTerrorism, SURVIVAL, Mar. 2003, at 67, 78, available at http://www.brookings.edu/views/
articles/fellows/shapiro20030301.pdf; see also GARAPON, supra note 50, at 5-6. The
Constitution Project takes issue with this view in arguing against national security courts:
“unlike tax and patent law, there is simply no highly specialized expertise that would form
relevant selection criteria for the judges.” A CRITIQUE OF “NATIONAL SECURITY COURTS,”
supra note 4, at 3. See also Coughenour, supra note 1 (arguing that federal judges have
adequate expertise to handle complex terrorism cases).
158. While assistance of counsel is generally believed to enhance truth-finding, in some
circumstances the Supreme Court has found it does not contribute significantly to decision
making accuracy. See, e.g., Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305
(1985) (rejecting due process challenge to federal statute limiting fees payable to lawyers
representing veterans’ benefit claimants); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18
(1981) (holding that Constitution does not require appointment of counsel for indigent
parents in every parental status termination proceeding).
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(which requires knowing a great deal about terrorist organizations as a
whole) might also be better understood and handled by a dedicated bar of
specialist attorneys with clearance and access to highly sensitive
159
intelligence, as some administrative detention advocates have proposed.
The need for restricting attorney choice in a comparatively transparent and
less time-sensitive incapacitation regime will likely be significantly lower.
Besides judicial and representational structure, the strategic purpose of
administrative detention and the corresponding definition of the substantive
class will also guide other aspects of institutional design, including
appropriate duration of detention and whether ongoing, periodic review is
warranted. If administrative detention is focused on incapacitation and
therefore defines the class by dangerousness, or on a proxy such as past acts
or membership in a group, individual detentions would logically last as long
as that condition exists – that is, as long as the individual poses that danger.
But whereas dangerousness itself may change over time (as events pass,
plots are thwarted, or as a detainee grows older or perhaps even
demonstrates regret or a decision to cooperate), conditions such as
160
membership or past actions do not. A factual assessment like the former
161
while assessing static
therefore probably merits periodic review,
conditions such as the latter does not (though it still may warrant time
limitations on detention).
In contrast to an incapacitation regime that would probably include
long-term detention, a disruption-based administrative detention system
could be effective with very short-term detentions; indeed, merely arresting
then releasing a terrorist plot member might cause his collaborators to stand
162
down.
And relatively short-term detentions might satisfy most
163
information-collection requirements but would provide little deterrent
threat to would-be terrorist collaborators.
Finally, the way strategic purposes and the subject class of individuals

159. See, e.g., Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 3.
160. Israel’s Unlawful Enemy Combatant Statute, discussed at supra note 97 and
accompanying text, requires re-examination of the need for continued detention every six
months. See Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762-2002 (Isr.), available at 32
ISRAELI Y.B. HUM. RTS. 389 (2002) and at http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/7E86 D0
98-0463-4F37-A38D-8AEBE770BDE6/0/IncarcerationLawedited140302.doc.
161. See Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 3; Wittes & Gitenstein, supra note 2, at 12;
see also Waxman, supra note 20.
162. The Spanish government, for example, uses criminal investigatory detention
powers – sometimes for very brief periods – in similar ways. See Victoria Burnett, After
Raids, 14 Held in Spain on Suspicion of a Terror Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2008, at A3; see
also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 50, at §VI, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/
node/62151/section/7 (detailing France’s use of broad arrest powers to disrupt terrorist
plotting).
163. But see Declaration of Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, supra note 72 (explaining
that intelligence collection through interrogation may take months or years to bear fruit in
some cases, especially when the suspect is trained to resist interrogation).
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are defined also drives the logic of decision-making transparency. An
incapacitation strategy is compatible with high levels of public scrutiny,
since there will usually be little reason to hide – and indeed much to gain
164
from disclosing openly – the underlying justification for a detention.
Some degree of transparency would be critical to a deterrence strategy as
well, to the extent locking up individuals aims to dissuade others from
certain specific conduct.
But the transparency of disruption-detention is more problematic,
because the government may not wish to tip off other plot collaborators or
cause public panic. Some European countries, for example, have laws that
allow individuals otherwise legally detained to be held incommunicado for
brief periods if cutting off communications (and sometimes even lawyer
165
access) is necessary to thwart terrorist attacks.
And informationcollection detention would require high levels of secrecy to avoid disclosing
166
sensitive intelligence or tipping off the targets of possible stings.
In any terrorist administrative detention system there will likely be a
need to safeguard sensitive intelligence information from public
dissemination, but in the cases of detention for disruption or informationgathering the very proceedings themselves might need to be at least
167
temporarily shielded from disclosure.
Such administrative detention
regimes might therefore have a greater need for closed or perhaps even ex
parte hearings (perhaps analogous to hearings by the Foreign Intelligence
168
Surveillance Court) than would a system designed for incapacitation or
deterrence.
This analysis points to an incapacitation regime and a disruption regime
– the two most promising strategic approaches to administrative detention
169
outlined above – with very different designs. An incapacitation system
could quite naturally feature generalist judges and lawyers conducting open
and transparent hearings to regulate what would often be long-term

164. On the strategic benefits of detention decision-making transparency, see Waxman,
supra note 20.
165. See Anna Oehmichen, Incommunicado Detention in Germany: An Example of
Reactive Anti-terror Legislation and Long-term Consequences, 9 GERMAN L. J. 855 (2008),
available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol09No07/PDF_Vol_09_No_07_855888_Articles_Oehmichen.pdf. These laws have come under significant scrutiny and legal
challenge. See id.
166. See Remarks by Attorney General Mukasey, supra note 8 (emphasizing the risks
of disclosing sensitive intelligence through processes to challenge detention).
167. For a view critical of secrecy in such contexts, see STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, THE
ENEMY WITHIN 12-14 (2002).
168. See 50 U.S.C.A. §1803 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008). Generally speaking, the FISC,
established by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub. L. No. 95511, 92 Stat. 1783, oversees requests for surveillance orders against suspected foreign
intelligence agents and terrorists inside the United States.
169. See supra notes 124-132 and accompanying text (explaining that incapacitation
and disruption are likely more strategically promising preventive detention approaches than
deterrence or information gathering).
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detention. A disruption system might require specialized courts and
lawyers operating to regulate short-term detention amid some secrecy.
There may therefore be a need to choose between strategic approaches in
fashioning a new law, or to consider a bifurcated system to handle the two
types of detention.
The broader point is that effective procedural design is not independent
of strategic purpose or the substantive definition of the detention class. It is
heavily driven by both.
CONCLUSION
This article began by explaining its purpose not to answer definitively
whether new administrative detention laws are needed or to offer a detailed
legislative road map, but rather to recast the terrorist detention discussion in
terms of purpose and substance before turning to procedure and institutions.
Most of the administrative detention debate moves too quickly to
procedural design. This risks missing major pieces of the puzzle, including
a clear appreciation of the specific marginal benefits and risks of various
detention strategies and proposed legal reforms. An administrative
detention system’s legitimacy and effectiveness – measured in terms of
both liberty and security – will depend at least as much on its purpose and
substantive standards as on its procedures.
Those proposing new administrative detention laws have been tempted
to take as the starting point existing enemy combatant detention policies
and to build onto them more robust and refined procedural protections.
Instead, reform proposals should consider narrower categories designed to
incapacitate the most dangerous suspects or disrupt imminent plots.
Working more methodically through the why and whom questions helps
illuminate the dangers of vague or broadly defined detention criteria and
sharpens the image of how more narrowly crafted administrative detention
could operate.

